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INTRODUCTION
In 2013, the Seventh Circuit became the first circuit to
explicitly reject an employer’s contention that an employment
discrimination lawsuit should be dismissed because the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) failed to engage in
out-of-court negotiation efforts with the employer before filing suit. 1
In EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, the Seventh Circuit addressed the
provision contained in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 that
requires the EEOC to satisfy certain conditions before it can file a
discrimination lawsuit against an employer.2 One of these conditions is
that the EEOC must engage in “informal methods of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion.”3 The purpose of these pre-suit
 J.D. candidate, May 2014, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of
Technology; B.A., History and Legal Studies, Northwestern University. I would like
to thank my professor, Hal Morris. I would also like to thank my family, especially
my parents, Robert and Rose DeLeon, for all of their support.
1
EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 172–73 (7th Cir. 2013).
2
Id.
3
Id. at 175.
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negotiations, or “conciliation,” is to provide an opportunity for the
EEOC to reach an out-of-court agreement with an employer to end the
employer’s discriminatory practices without seeking a judicial
remedy.4 The court held, however, that an employer’s claim that the
EEOC failed to engage in conciliation is “not an affirmative defense to
the merits of an employment discrimination suit.”5 That is, the
EEOC’s alleged failure to comply with Title VII’s conciliation
requirement is not grounds for dismissal of an employment
discrimination lawsuit on the merits.6
The crux of the court’s reasoning in Mach is that the EEOC’s
conciliation process is not—and should not be—judicially
reviewable.7 The court stated that “[i]f the EEOC has pled on the face
of its complaint that it has complied with all procedures required under
Title VII and the relevant documents are facially sufficient . . . our
review of those procedures is satisfied.”8 In rendering this decision,
the court stressed that the language of Title VII does not authorize
judicial review of the conciliation process.9 Furthermore, the court
found that there is no meaningful standard by which to evaluate
conciliation, especially because Title VII’s confidentiality requirement
prohibits disclosure of the details of the conciliation process in
subsequent hearings.10 As such, it would be impossible for a court to
make any meaningful determinations regarding the EEOC’s
conciliation efforts because the court would not have access to
relevant information regarding what happened during the conciliation
process.11 The Mach court also asserts that Title VII contraindicates
judicial review of conciliation because it grants the EEOC absolute
discretion in deciding whether to accept an employer’s offer of

4

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b) (2009).
Mach, 738 F.3d at 172.
6
Id.
7
Id. at 177.
8
Id. at 184.
9
Id. at 174–75.
10
Id. at 174–76.
11
Id.
5
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compliance.12 In other words, courts do not have the authority to
determine the sufficiency of the conciliation process because Title VII
delegates that authority exclusively to the EEOC.13 The court also
noted that, contrary to Mach Mining’s contention, the EEOC’s alleged
failure-to-conciliate was not grounds for dismissal on the merits
because “letting one party off the hook entirely” would be “too final
and drastic a remedy for any procedural deficiency in conciliation.”14
Thus, the Mach court held that courts may not conduct any
investigation whatsoever into the adequacy of the EEOC’s conciliation
efforts.15 Indeed, the court even refused to recognize, as other circuits
have, an implied “good faith” requirement in the EEOC’s conciliation
efforts.16 The court stated that it is too difficult to enforce a good faith
obligation upon the EEOC because it would run contrary to the
EEOC’s unilateral authority to reject even the most generous
conciliation offers.17 Ultimately, the result of the Seventh Circuit’s
holding is that the EEOC need not engage in extensive or thorough
conciliation efforts.18 In fact, its efforts need not even be made in good
faith.19 So long as the EEOC pleads, in its complaint, that it complied
with Title VII’s requirements, the court will deem the requirement
fulfilled.20
At first glance, it seems as though the Seventh Circuit, in its
sharp divergence with every other circuit that has considered this
issue, took an extreme approach to interpreting Title VII, and that the
Mach decision has rendered the conciliation requirement utterly
toothless. Upon closer examination, however, it becomes apparent that
the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation of the conciliation requirement is
fully consistent with the text and purpose of Title VII. As the court
noted, Title VII gives the EEOC full discretion in defining and
12

Id. at 175.
Id.
14
Id. at 184.
15
Id. at 184.
16
Id. at 182–83.
17
Id.
18
See id. at 184.
19
Id. at 176–77.
20
Id. at 184.
13

372

Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2014

3

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 7

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 9, Issue 2

Spring 2014

executing the conciliation process and effectively ensures that the
conciliation process is insulated from judicial scrutiny by guaranteeing
that the substance of the process remain confidential.21 Furthermore,
as the Supreme Court noted in Occidental Life Insurance of California
v. EEOC, “the individual’s rights to redress are paramount under the
provisions of Title VII” and it is therefore ““necessary that all avenues
be left open for quick and effective relief.”22 With the individual’s
right to redress in mind, it would be counterintuitive to permanently
bar an aggrieved employee’s discrimination claim based upon a mere
procedural deficiency.23 Title VII’s conciliation requirement, then,
does not, and should not, create a hurdle that the EEOC must
overcome before it can file an employment discrimination lawsuit.
Rather, the requirement is best characterized as a procedural formality
that gives the employer an opportunity to avoid litigation by
voluntarily complying with Title VII’s requirements.24
The first section of this note provides general background
information regarding the conciliation requirement and Title VII. The
second section provides an overview of how other circuits have
addressed judicial reviewability of conciliation. The third section
analyzes the Seventh Circuit’s holding in Mach Mining and examines
how the court’s reasoning relates to other Seventh Circuit case law
involving EEOC litigation. And finally, the fourth section argues that
that the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Mach is supported by the
statutory text and overall purpose of Title VII.

21

Id. at 173.
Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 366 (U.S. 1977) (quoting
118 CONG. REC. 1068-1069 (1972)).
23
See Mach, 738 F.3d at 172.
24
Id. at 180. Cf. Alexander v. Sandoval, 121 S. Ct. 1511, 1521 (2001)
(“Statutes that focus on the person regulated rather than the individuals protected
create ‘no implication of an intent to confer rights on a particular class of persons.’”)
(quoting California v. Sierra Club, 101 S.Ct. 1775 (1981)).
22
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I. THE CONCILIATION REQUIREMENT AND TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the EEOC
may bring suit against employers who engage in discriminatory
employment practices.25 Before filing suit, however, the EEOC must
engage in conciliation efforts with the employer. 26 That is, once the
EEOC has reasonable cause to believe an employer is engaging in
discriminatory practices, it must try to reach an out-of-court agreement
with the employer to end such practices.27 If the EEOC is unable to
reach a conciliation agreement that is acceptable to the Commission,
the Commission may then file an employment discrimination lawsuit
against the employer.28
Section 2000e-5 of Title VII explains the process by which the
EEOC handles allegations of employment discrimination and reads, in
relevant part:
Whenever a charge is filed by or on behalf of a person
claiming to be aggrieved, or by a member of the Commission,
alleging that an employer . . . has engaged in an unlawful
employment practice, the Commission shall serve a notice of
the charge . . . and shall make an investigation thereof. . . . If
the Commission determines after such investigation that there
is not reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, it
shall dismiss the charge and promptly notify the person
claiming to be aggrieved and the respondent of its action
. . . If the Commission determines after such investigation
that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is
true, the Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such
alleged unlawful employment practice by informal methods
of conference, conciliation, and persuasion. Nothing said or
25

42 U.S.C., § 2000e-5(b); see Note, Judicial Responses to the EEOC’s
Failure to Attempt Conciliation, 81 MICH. L. REV. 433, 441 (1982).
26
42 U.S.C.A., § 2000e-5(b).
27
42 U.S.C.A., § 2000e-5(b).
28
42 U.S.C.A., § 2000e-5(b).
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done during and as a part of such informal endeavors may be
made public by the Commission, its officers or employees, or
used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding without the
written consent of the persons concerned. . . . If within thirty
days after a charge is filed with the Commission or within
thirty days after expiration of any period of reference under
subsection (c) or (d) of this section, the Commission has been
unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation
agreement acceptable to the Commission, the Commission
may bring a civil action against any respondent. . .29
Either an aggrieved employee or a member of the Commission may
file a “charge” of discrimination with the EEOC.30 When the EEOC
receives such a charge, it must notify the employer of the grievance
within ten days.31 Then, the EEOC must investigate whether
reasonable cause exists to support the allegation.32 If, after
investigating, the EEOC determines there is not reasonable cause to
believe that the allegation is true, it must dismiss the charge.33 If,
however, the EEOC determines that reasonable cause exists that the
allegation is true, the conciliation process is triggered.34 The EEOC
must then “endeavor to eliminate . . . unlawful employment practices
by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.”35 If
the EEOC is “unable to secure from the respondent a conciliation
agreement acceptable to the Commission,” the Commission may then
file a lawsuit against the employer within thirty days after the date that
the charge was filed.36

29

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.; see Anthony P. Zana, A Pragmatic Approach to EEOC Misconduct:
Drawing A Line on Commission Bad Faith in Title VII Litigation, 73 MISS. L.J. 289,
292–94 (2003).
31
Zana, supra note 30.
32
42 U.S.C.A., § 2000e-5(b).
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id.
30
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Additionally, Section 2000e(f)(1) of Title VII provides an
alternative remedy by which an aggrieved employee can seek relief if
the employee is dissatisfied with the EEOC’s progress in investigating,
conciliating, or prosecuting his or her charge.37 This section reads, in
relevant part:
If a charge filed with the Commission . . . is dismissed by the
Commission, or if within one hundred and eighty days from
the filing of such charge[,] . . . the Commission has not filed a
civil action under this section . . . or the Commission has not
entered into a conciliation agreement to which the person
aggrieved is a party, . . . a civil action may be brought against
the respondent named in the charge (A) by the person
claiming to be aggrieved or (B) if such charge was filed by a
member of the Commission, by any person whom the charge
alleges was aggrieved by the alleged unlawful employment
practice.38
That is, a complainant may circumvent the EEOC’s procedures and
seek relief through a private action in district court.39 This private right
of action, however, does not arise until the employee receives a “right
to sue” letter from the EEOC, which states that the EEOC does not
intend to file suit against the employer.40 The EEOC is required to
send this letter within 180 days after the date the charge was filed.41
The Supreme Court examined this provision in Occidental Life
Insurance of California v. EEOC, wherein the Court held that the 180day limitation was not a statute of limitations on EEOC enforcement
suits, but rather addressed an alternative enforcement procedure.42 The
Court stated that “[t]he retention of the private right of action . . . is
designed to make sure that the person aggrieved does not have to
37

Id.
Id.
39
Id.
40
Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir. 2006).
41
Stewart v. EEOC, 611 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir. 1979).
42
432 U.S. 355, 361 (1977).
38
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endure lengthy delays if the Commission . . . does not act with due
diligence and speed.”43 The Court added that this provision “allow[s]
the person aggrieved to elect to pursue his or her own remedy under
this title in the courts where there is agency inaction, dalliance or
dismissal of the charge, or unsatisfactory resolution.”44
Notably, as originally enacted, Title VII only granted
individual employees the right to sue an employer for discrimination,
and the EEOC could only seek voluntary compliance through
conciliation.45 Over time, however, voluntary compliance proved
elusive, as more than half of the EEOC’s conciliation efforts were
unsuccessful.46 Consequently, Congress enacted the Equal
Opportunity Act of 1972, which amended Title VII to permit the
EEOC to sue employers for engaging in discriminatory practices.47
Under the revised Act, the EEOC’s power to sue employers is
conditioned on its inability to “secure from the respondent a
conciliation agreement acceptable to the EEOC.”48 In other words, the
EEOC must make conciliation efforts, and may only sue an employer
if it is unsatisfied with the results of the conciliation process. Title VII
also requires that the conciliation process remain confidential, stating
that “nothing said or done and as part of such informal endeavors may
be made public by the Commission, its officers or employers, or used
as evidence in a subsequent proceeding without the written consent of
the person concerned.”49 The statute provides no additional
information about the requirements of the conciliation process.50
The conciliation process itself has several benefits.51 It gives
the employer an opportunity to explain or justify its conduct before
43

Id. at 365–66 (quoting 118 CONG. REC. 1068–1069 (1972)).
Occidental Life, 432 U.S. at 365.
45
Judicial Responses to the EEOC’s Failure to Attempt Conciliation, supra
note 25, at 441–42.
46
EEOC v. CRST Van Expedited, 679 F.3d 657, 682 (8th Cir. 2012) (quoting
EEOC v. Hickey-Mitchell Co., 507 F.2d 944, 947 (8th Cir. 1974)).
47
42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f); see CRST Van Expedited, 679 F.3d at 682.
48
CRST Van Expedited, 679 F.3d at 682.
49
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
50
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
51
Note, III. Procedure Under Title VII, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1195, 1200 (1971).
44
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litigation receives widespread public attention.52 Additionally,
conciliation is generally less expensive and less time consuming than
litigation.53 As the Seventh Circuit noted, the purpose of conciliation
and other pre-suit requirements is to “encourage the complainant and
the employer . . . to resolve their dispute informally.”54 The court also
noted that informal resolutions aid in “reducing the burden on the
courts of enforcing Title VII.”55 Despite the theoretical advantages of
conciliation, however, EEOC conciliation has been less than a
complete success.56 To date, the EEOC has been unable to achieve
even partially successful conciliation in more than half the cases in
which it was attempted.57
While conciliation undoubtedly has multiple benefits and is
clearly a prerequisite to the EEOC’s authority to file a lawsuit against
an employer, the EEOC is granted great deference in defining the
parameters and procedures that comprise conciliation. In fact,
commentators have noted that the EEOC’s conciliation and
investigation process, “probably require the most discretion by EEOC
officers and, not coincidentally, are often the most vulnerable for an
employer to challenge.”58 Indeed, the conciliation process has been the
subject of much litigation, and circuit courts sharply split on whether,
and to what extent, the conciliation process is subject to judicial
review.59 The Seventh Circuit’s holding in Mach deepened and
complicated the circuit split, as explained below.60

52

Id.
Id.
54
Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir. 2006).
55
Id. at 708–09.
56
III. Procedure Under Title VII, supra note 51, at 1200.
57
Id.
58
Zana, supra note 30, at 292–94.
59
See EEOC v. Mach Mining, 738 F.3d 171, 182 (7th Cir. 2013).
60
Id.
53
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II. CIRCUIT SPLIT
The Seventh Circuit stands alone in holding that the EEOC’s
conciliation process is not subject to any level of judicial review.61
Eight circuits have examined this issue, and each held or, at a
minimum, assumed that the conciliation process is subject to some
level of judicial review.62 Of these eight circuits, six have articulated
specific standards of review, falling into two camps.63 The first camp,
comprised of the Fourth, Sixth, and Tenth Circuits, evaluates the
conciliation process by asking generally whether the EEOC acted
“reasonably” or in “good faith.”64 The second camp, comprised of the
Second, Fifth and Eleventh Circuits, evaluates the conciliation under a
more searching three-part inquiry.65 This latter standard requires the
61

Id.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 13, EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d
171 (7th Cir. 2013) (No. 13-1019), 2014 WL 709677, at *8.
63
Id. at 12-19. The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have found that the conciliation
process is judicially reviewable, but neither Circuit has explicitly adopted a precise
standard by which courts should review the process. See, e.g., EEOC v. CRST Van
Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657, 676–77 (8th Cir. 2012) (reviewing the adequacy of
the EEOC’s conciliation and investigation processes to determine whether the
EEOC’s case should be dismissed); EEOC v. Trans States Airlines, 462 F.3d 987,
996 (8th Cir. 2006) (permitting judicial review into the “EEOC’s failure to satisfy its
obligation to conciliate” to decide whether to award attorney’s fees against the
EEOC); EEOC v. Bruno’s Rest., 13 F.3d 285, 288–89 (9th Cir. 1993) (reviewing
adequacy of conciliation efforts in context of request for attorney’s fee award against
the agency).
64
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 62, at 12–13; see, e.g., EEOC v.
Am. Nat’l Bank, 652 F.2d 1176, 1185–86 (4th Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Radiator
Specialty Co., 610 F.2d 178, 183 (4th Cir. 1979); EEOC v. Keco Indus., Inc., 748
F.2d 1097, 1101–02 (6th Cir. 1984); EEOC v. Zia Co., 582 F.2d 527, 532-34 (10th
Cir. 1978).
65
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 62, at 18; see, e.g., EEOC v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co., 650 F.2d 14, 18–19 (2d Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Johnson & Higgins,
Inc., 91 F.3d 1529, 1534-35 (2d Cir. 1996); EEOC v. Agro Distribution, LLC, 555
F.3d 462, 467-69 (5th Cir. 2009); EEOC v. Klingler Elec. Corp., 636 F.2d 104, 10607 (5th Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Pet, Ic., Funsten Nut Div., 612 F.2d 1001, 1002-03 (5th
Cir. 1980); EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1259-61 (11th Cir.
2003).
62
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EEOC: 1) to outline to the employer the reasonable cause for its belief
that Title VII has been violated; 2) to offer an opportunity for
voluntary compliance; and 3) to respond in a reasonable and flexible
manner to the reasonable attitudes of the employer.66
These eight circuits allow courts to review the EEOC’s
conciliation process,67 even though Title VII mandates that the details
of the conciliation process remain confidential.68 This begs the
question: how can a court make a determination regarding any aspect
of the conciliation process if the court cannot probe into the details of
that process? The eight circuits that allow for judicial review answer
this question by drawing a distinction between review of the
conciliation process, which they permit, and review of the substance of
the EEOC’s position, which they supposedly prohibit.69 In EEOC v.
Zia Co., for example, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that “a court
should not examine the details of the offers and counteroffers between
the parties, nor impose its notions of what the agreement should
provide.”70 Nevertheless, the court determined that the EEOC’s
conciliation process was insufficient because the EEOC refused to reopen conciliation to resolve a dispute over the proposed conciliation
agreement.71 In Mach, the Seventh Circuit stated that drawing this type
of distinction between process and substance is “too fine a thread on
which to hang judicial review”72 because it “slide[s] easily from
review of the form of conciliation toward more substantive scrutiny.”73
The Mach court stated that review of the EEOC’s conciliation efforts
“would almost inevitably find itself engaged in a prohibited inquiry
into the substantive reasonableness of particular offers, not to mention
using confidential and inadmissible materials as evidence—unless its
review were so cursory as to be meaningless.”74
66

Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 62, at 18.
Id. at 13.
68
42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b).
69
EEOC v. Mach Mining, 738 F.3d 171, 175 (7th Cir. 2013).
70
582 F.2d 527, 533 (10th Cir. 1978).
71
Id. at 534.
72
Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 184.
73
Id.
74
Id. at 177.
67
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To the extent that circuits have attempted to justify their
allowance of judicial review of the conciliation process, most have
pointed generally to Congress's intention that the EEOC address
discrimination through voluntary settlement.75 The Eleventh Circuit,
for example, has highlighted that Title VII’s conciliation requirement
“clearly reflects a strong congressional desire for out-of-court
settlements of Title VII violations.”76 The Eighth Circuit echoed this
sentiment, reasoning that“[a]lthough the EEOC enjoys wide latitude in
investigating and filing lawsuits related to charges of discrimination,
Title VII limits that latitude to some degree by plac[ing] a strong
emphasis on administrative, rather than judicial, resolution of
disputes.”77 The Seventh Circuit, however, was unpersuaded by these
justifications, stating it was “skeptical that court oversight is necessary
or that it encourages compliance rather than strategic evasion on the
part of employers.”78 The Seventh Circuit opined that judicial review
of the conciliation process would not encourage voluntary compliance
with Title VII.79 On the contrary, it would undermine conciliation by
tempting employers “to turn what was meant to be an informal
negotiation into the subject of endless disputes over whether the
EEOC did enough before going to court.”80 The court also pointed out
that, even without judicial review, the conciliation process is subject to
meaningful scrutiny.81 Namely, Congress can exert its influence on the
EEOC through oversight hearings, adjustments to appropriations, and
statutory amendments.82

75

Id. at 183.
EEOC v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 340 F.3d 1256, 1260 (11th Cir. 2003)
(citing Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888 (5th Cir.1970)).
77
EEOC. v. CRST Van Expedited, Inc., 679 F.3d 657, 674 (8th Cir. 2012)
(internal quotations omitted) (citing U.S. Equal Opportunity Comm'n v. Dillard's
Inc., No. 08–CV–1780–IEG (PCL), 2011 WL 2784516, slip op. at *5 (S.D. Cal. July
14, 2011)).
78
Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 183.
79
Id. at 178–79.
80
Id.
81
Id. at 180.
82
Id.
76
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Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit expressly rejected the “good
faith” requirement imposed by the Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits.83
In Mach, the defendant-employer argued that the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) offers a template for how courts should analyze
good faith in this context.84 The Seventh Circuit rejected this argument
because, unlike the NLRA, Title VII does not contain an explicit
statutory command to employers and unions to negotiate in good
faith.85 Further, the Mach court stated that it is “difficult . . . to enforce
such a duty, because it jostles uneasily with the right of each party to a
labor negotiation to refuse an offer by the other even if a neutral
observer would think it a fair, or even a generous offer.”86
Additionally, in Mach, the EEOC cited to the Congressional
record in both its appellate brief and its motion for certification to
support its argument that a “good faith” requirement is inconsistent
with the language and intent of Title VII.87 In both its brief and
motion, the EEOC highlighted that a majority of senators who
considered the matter disfavored judicial review of conciliation.88
Senator Samuel Ervin, for example, found such a suggestion to be
“inconceivable,” stating “I do not know . . . how a court could probe
into the minds of the Commission [to determine] whether they did or
did not, in good faith, decide that they would or would not work out a
conciliation agreement.”89 Senator Jacob Javits added that allowing

83

Id. at 176
Id.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 176 (citing Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 711 (7th Cir. 2006)).
87
Brief of Appellant at 11–17, EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171 (7th
Cir. 2013) (No. 13-2456); Plaintiff EEOC's Motion to Reconsider or to Certify
Under 1292(b) at 10–11, EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171 (No. 11–cv–
00879–JPG–PMF).
88
Brief of Appellant, supra note 87, at 13–16; Plaintiff EEOC's Motion to
Reconsider or to Certify Under 1292(b), supra note 87, at 10–11.
89
Brief of Appellant, supra note 87, at 11. (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 3807 (Feb.
14, 1972)); Plaintiff EEOC's Motion to Reconsider or to Certify Under 1292(b),
supra note 87, at 10. (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 3807 (Feb. 14, 1972)).
84

382
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judicial review would “introduce a totally different standard than
anything encompassed by our laws or practice.”90
By rejecting the “good faith” requirement, and refusing to
subject conciliation to any level of judicial scrutiny, the Mach court
sharply disagreed with its sister circuits. The court’s reasoning for this
divergence is reviewed and analyzed below.
III.

EEOC V. MACH MINING, LLC.

In E.E.O.C. v. Mach Mining, an employer-defendant sought
dismissal of a discrimination suit on the grounds that the EEOC failed
to comply with Title VII’s requirements.91 Namely, the employer
alleged that the EEOC failed to engage in good faith conciliation
before filing suit.92 The court held, however, that failure-to-conciliate
was not grounds for dismissal on the merits because the conciliation
process is not subject to judicial review.93 This decision is consistent
with the Seventh Circuit’s reluctance to allow courts to review and
evaluate the adequacy of the EEOC’s pre-suit processes.94 In Mach,
the court defended its reasoning, stating that it was “consistent with
our earlier cases rejecting similar attempts by employers to change the

90

Brief of Appellant, supra note 87, at 11. (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 3807 (Feb.
14, 1972)); Plaintiff EEOC's Motion to Reconsider or to Certify Under 1292(b),
supra note 87 at 10. (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 3807 (Feb. 14, 1972))
91
Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 171.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 171–72.
94
See Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 2006) (refusing to
review whether an employee cooperated during pre-suit proceedings); EEOC v.
Caterpillar, Inc. 409 F.3d 831, 833 (7th Cir. 2005) (the “existence of probable cause
to sue is generally and in this instance not judicially reviewable.”); EEOC v. Elgin
Teachers Assoc., 27 F.3d 292, 294 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that the decision to file
suit is within the sole discretion of the EEOC “rather than the judiciary); McCottrell
v. EEOC, 726 F.2d 350, 351 (7th Cir. 1984) (refusing to review the EEOC’s “no
reasonable cause” determination); Stewart v. EEOC, 611 F.2d 679, 682 (7th Cir.
1979) (refusing to review the adequacy or timeliness of the EEOC’s pre-suit
investigation and “reasonable cause” determination).
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focus from their employment practices to the agency’s pre-suit
processes.”95
A. Facts and Procedural History
In early 2008, the EEOC received a charge of discrimination from
a woman who claimed Mach Mining did not hire a number of coal
miner applicants based on gender.96 The EEOC investigated the charge
and determined that there was reasonable cause to believe Mach
Mining had, in fact, discriminated against a class of female job
applicants at its mine near Johnston City, Illinois.97 According to the
EEOC, Mach Mining had never hired a single female for a miningrelated position and did not even have a women’s bathroom at its
mining site.98 In late 2010, the EEOC notified Mach Mining of its
intent to begin formal conciliation efforts.99 The parties discussed
possible resolutions, but ultimately, the EEOC and Mach Mining did
not reach a conciliation agreement.100
In September 2011, the EEOC informed Mach Mining that the
conciliation process was unsuccessful and that further conciliation
efforts would be futile.101 Two weeks later, the EEOC filed its
complaint against Mach Mining.102 The complaint alleged that Mach
Mining violated Title VII by engaging in a pattern or practice of
unlawful employment practices since at least January 1, 2006.103 The
95

Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 181.
Id. at 173.
97
Id.
98
EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, No. 11–cv–879–JPG–PMF, 2013 WL 319337,
at *1 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2013), rev’d, 738 F.3d 171 (7th Cir. 2013); EEOC v. Mach
Mining, LLC, No. 11-CV-879-JPG-PMF, 2013 WL 2177770 at *1 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 20,
2013).
99
Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 173.
100
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id.
103
EEOC v. Mach Mining, No. 11–cv–879–JPG–PMF, 2013 WL 319337 (S.D.
Ill. Dec. 20, 2013); EEOC v. Mach Mining, No. 11-cv-879-JPG-PMF, 2013 WL
2177770, at *1 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2013).
96
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complaint also stated that the action was “authorized and instituted
pursuant to Sections 706(f)(1) and (3) and 707 of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, as amended.”104
Mach Mining’s answer to the complaint denied unlawful
discrimination and asserted several affirmative defenses, one of which
claimed that the suit should be dismissed because the EEOC failed to
conciliate in good faith.105 The EEOC moved for summary judgment
solely on the issue of whether, as a matter of law, an alleged failure to
conciliate is a valid affirmative defense to an employment
discrimination suit. 106 The EEOC’s motion did not address the
sufficiency of its conciliation efforts – rather, the EEOC only argued
that Title VII did not authorize judicial review of the EEOC’s
conciliation efforts.107
The district court denied the EEOC’s motion, holding that
courts should evaluate conciliation to the extent needed to “determine
whether the EEOC made ‘a sincere and reasonable effort to
negotiate.’”108 The EEOC then filed a Motion to Reconsider or Certify
for immediate appellate review.109 In its motion, the EEOC
characterized Mach Mining’s failure-to-conciliate defense as “an
attempt to whittle away the class of women for whom the EEOC may
obtain relief” for unlawful employment practices.110 Although the
district court denied the EEOC’s Motion to Reconsider, it granted the
EEOC’s Motion to Certify because the EEOC established the four
104

Complaint at 1, EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d at 171 (No. 11–cv–
879–JPG–PM).
105
Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 173.
106
EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, No. 11–cv–879–JPG–PMF, 2013 WL 319337
(S.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2013); EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, No. 11-CV-879-JPG-PMF,
2013 WL 2177770, at *2.
107
Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 173.
108
EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, No. 11-cv-879-JPG-PMF, 2013 WL 319337,
at *5 (S.D. Ill, Jan. 28, 2013) (quoting EEOC v. Menard, Inc., No. 08–cv–0655–
DRH, 2009 WL 1708628, at *1 (S.D. Ill. June 17, 2009)).
109
EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, No. 11-CV-879-JPG-PMF, 2013 WL
2177770, at *1.
110
Plaintiff EEOC's Motion to Reconsider or to Certify Under 1292(b), supra
note 87, at 1.
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statutory criteria111 for certification.112 Accordingly, the court certified
the following questions for immediate appellate review: whether
courts may review the EEOC’s informal efforts to secure a
conciliation agreement acceptable to the EEOC before filing suit? If
courts may review the EEOC’s conciliation efforts, should the
reviewing court apply a deferential or heightened scrutiny standard of
review?113
The Seventh Circuit issued its opinion on December 20, 2013,
holding that conciliation is not subject to any level of judicial review,
and thus failure-to-conciliate is not a valid affirmative defense to the
EEOC’s unlawful employment discrimination suit.114 The Seventh
Circuit’s reasoning is explained and analyzed below.
On February 25, 2014, Mach Mining filed a Petition for Writ
of Certiorari for the Seventh Circuit’s decision to be reviewed by the
United States Supreme Court.115
B. The Language of Title VII Does Not Authorize Judicial Review of
the Conciliation Process
The Mach court stressed that Title VII contains no express
provisions for judicial review of the EEOC’s conciliation process and
does not provide for an affirmative defense based on an alleged defect
in the EEOC’s conciliation efforts.116 Highlighting the “precise,

111

There are four statutory criteria for the grant of a section 1292(b): there must
be a question of law, it must be controlling, it must be contestable, and its resolution
must promise to speed up the litigation. Ahrenholz v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ill., 219
F.3d 674, 676 (7th Cir. 2000).
112
EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, No. 11–cv–879–JPG–PMF, 2013 WL 319337
(S.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2013); EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, (No. 11-CV-879-JPG-PMF),
2013 WL 2177770, at *6 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2013).
113
EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, (No. 11-CV-879-JPG-PMF), 2013 WL
2177770, at *6 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2013).
114
Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 184.
115
Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 62.
116
Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 174.
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complex, and exhaustive nature”117 of Title VII, the court stated “this
silence itself is compelling.”118 In the absence of an express
authorization for judicial review, the court refused to read an implied
authorization into Title VII because it is “incorrect to infer that
Congress meant anything than what the text does say.”119 The EEOC
also highlights this silence in its appellate brief, pointing out:
No provision specifically articulates what the EEOC must do
besides attempt conciliation and decide whether the employer
offered a conciliation agreement acceptable to the
Commission. No provision authorizes judicial review of that
decision. No provision declares what venue would hear
challenges based on alleged failures to conciliate. No
provision establishes what standard of review would apply in
assessing the validity of that decision. And no provision
articulates what the remedy should be if the EEOC fails to
fulfill its duty to engage in conciliation.120
Because the EEOC neither expressly authorizes judicial review, nor
provides guidance as to how the conciliation process should be
reviewed, the court infers Congress did not intend conciliation to be
reviewable. Rather, the court need only verify whether the EEOC
pleaded on the face of its complaint that it complied with Title VII’s
requirements.121
The EEOC also argued that Title VII’s failure to require a
formalized record of the conciliation process is further evidence that
Congress did not intend to authorize judicial review of conciliation.122
117

Id. (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2530,

(2013)).
118

Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 174.
Id.
120
Brief of Appellant, supra note 87, at 7–8
121
Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 184.
122
Brief of Appellant, supra note 87, at 10.; see ICC v. Locomotive Eng’rs,
482 U.S. 270, 283-84 (1987) (rejecting judicial review of denials of reconsideration
because of the lack of consistent recordkeeping, reasoning that review was not
119
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The EEOC used the Congressional record to support this argument,
noting that Senator Williams voiced concern that review of
conciliation would be problematic because there would be no record of
the informal conferences, phone calls, and meetings.123 Thus, courts
would be forced to review an incomplete record that does not
accurately represent what occurred.124 This reasoning is consistent
with the Seventh Circuit’s previous refusals to review the adequacy of
the EEOC’s statutorily-required pre-suit actions, especially when
statutory text is contraindicative of such review.125
1.

Stewart v. EEOC

In Stewart v. EEOC, several employees sought review of the
EEOC’s alleged failure to make timely reasonable cause
determinations of their charges.126 The employees claimed that the
EEOC failed to satisfy the procedural requirements of Title VII by
neglecting their charges of employment discrimination by allowing the
charges to remain “uninvestigated, unprocessed, and without
reasonable cause determinations for one to more than two years.”127
The Seventh Circuit, however, refused to probe into the EEOC’s presuit procedures, reasoning that Title VII does not authorize review of
the challenged agency actions by the EEOC.128 The Court relied
heavily on the language of Title VII, stating that “[h]ad Congress
intended a remedy of enforcement against the EEOC, the provisions of

workable because “the vast majority of denials of reconsideration . . . are made
without a statement of reasons”).
123
118 Cong. Rec. 3806 (Feb. 14, 1972).
124
Brief of Appellant, supra note 87, at 10.
125
See EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 181 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[The
Seventh Circuit’s] rejection of the [failure-to-conciliate] defense is consistent with
[the Seventh Circuit’s] earlier cases rejecting similar attempts by employers to
change the focus from their employment practices to the agency's pre-suit
processes.”)
126
Stewart v. EEOC, 611 F.2d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 1979).
127
Id. at 681.
128
Id.
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[Title VII] would have so indicated.”129 This reasoning is consistent
with the court’s reasoning in Mach. In both cases, the Seventh Circuit
adhered to the plain text of Title VII and refused to read an implied
remedy into the statute.130
2.

McCottrell v. EEOC

In McCottrell v. EEOC, the Seventh Circuit refused to review
the EEOC’s finding that there was no reasonable cause to believe that
an employee’s discrimination charge was true.131 After the EEOC
made its “no reasonable cause” determination, the employee filed suit
against his employer and eventually reached a settlement.132 The
employee then sued the EEOC, arguing that the settlement was
evidence that the EEOC’s “no reasonable cause” determination was
erroneous.133 The Seventh Circuit, however, refused to review the
EEOC’s finding, holding that “Title VII does not provide either an
express or implied cause of action against the EEOC to challenge its
investigation and processing of a charge.”134 This reasoning illustrates
the Seventh Circuit’s continued refusal to allow for judicial review of
the EEOC’s pre-suit processes where Title VII does not expressly
allow for such review.
3.

Doe v. Oberweis Dairy

In Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, twenty-seven years after
McCottrell, the Seventh Circuit rejected a defendant-employer’s
argument that an employee’s failure to cooperate with the EEOC “in
good faith” during pre-suit proceedings entitled the employer to
summary judgment.135 Although Title VII requires that complainants
129

Id. at 682.
Id.; EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 174 (7th Cir. 2013).
131
McCottrell v. EEOC, 726 F.2d 350, 351 (7th Cir. 1984).
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 2006).
130
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cooperate with investigations, the court refused to accept that the
“good faith” cooperation was a prerequisite to suit or that alleged
failure to cooperate could be an affirmative defense.136 The court
refused to review the employee’s pre-suit activities, reasoning that
Title VII provided no basis to review whether the employee
cooperated in “good-faith.”137 The court added that reading a goodfaith requirement into the statute in the absence of express statutory
language authorizing such a requirement would be “adventurous” and
would “distress originalists.”138 The court also warned that, “[t]o allow
employers to inject such an issue by way of defense in every Title VII
case would cast a pall over litigation under that statute.”139
In Mach, the EEOC cited the reasoning of Oberweis in its
appellate brief, stating that the Seventh Circuit “could have been
writing about review of conciliation when it offered its reasons for
rejecting review of an employee’s pre−suit activities.”140 Just as there
is no statutory basis for a “good faith” requirement regarding an
employee’s cooperation with the EEOC, there is also no basis for a
“good faith” requirement regarding the EEOC’s conciliation efforts.141
The Oberweis court opined that any risk that employees will fail to
cooperate with the EEOC, thereby “thwart[ing] the conciliation
process and . . . thrust[ing] additional cases on the federal court is a
slight one.”142 Similarly, refusal to subject conciliation to judicial
scrutiny will not substantially thwart conciliation.143 As the Mach
court noted, the EEOC is constrained by the “practical limitations of
budget and personnel,” and thus “has its own powerful incentives to
conciliate.”144
The Seventh Circuit consistently refuses to permit judicial
review of the EEOC’s statutorily-mandated processes when Title VII
136

Id.
Id. at 711.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Brief of Appellant, supra note 87, at 14.
141
See EEOC v. Mach Mining LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 176–77 (7th Cir. 2013).
142
Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d at 710.
143
Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 180.
144
Id.
137
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does not expressly authorize such review.145 Nevertheless, the Mach
court does not rest solely upon statutory silence.146 On the contrary,
the court argues that Title VII effectively prohibits such review.147
More specifically, the court reasoned that Title VII’s requirement that
the details of the conciliation process remain confidential in
combination with its provision that the EEOC retain complete
deference in the conciliation process, are contraindicative of judicial
review.148
C. Title VII’s Confidentiality Provision Contraindicates Judicial
Review of Conciliation
The Mach court reasoned that judicial review of the
conciliation process conflicts directly with the confidentiality
provision of Title VII.149 The court concluded that Title VII effectively
prohibits judicial review of the conciliation process because it requires
the details of conciliation to remain confidential.150 Title VII states
“[n]othing said or done during and as a part of such informal
endeavors may be made public by the Commission, its officers or
employees, or used as evidence in a subsequent proceeding without
the written consent of the persons concerned.”151 In fact, violators of
this strict confidentiality requirement may even be subject to criminal
prosecution.152
The Mach court reasoned that, because of this provision, a
court would not have access to any of the relevant information
necessary to evaluate any aspect of the process, and thus Title VII
contraindicates judicial review.153 The court pointed out that Title VII
contains no exception allowing information about conciliation to be
145

See EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171 (7th Cir. 2013).
Id. at 174.
147
Id.
148
Id. at 174–75.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
42 U.S.C.A., § 2000e-5(b).
152
42 U.S.C.A., § 2000e-5(b).
153
Mach Mining, 738 F.3d 174–75 (7th Cir. 2013).
146
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admitted for collateral purposes, such as to satisfy a court that
conciliation occurred or that the EEOC’s conciliation efforts were
sufficient.154 Therefore, it would be impossible for courts to
meaningfully evaluate any conciliation process because Title VII’s
confidentiality requirement prohibits the court from accessing any
information about the conciliation process.155 Essentially, the court
would be required to evaluate conciliation without any evidence.156
The court thus concluded that judicial review of the conciliation
process directly contradicts Title VII’s confidentiality requirement.157
In Mach, the district court resolved this contradiction by
interpreting the statute as allowing information about the conciliation
process to be introduced during litigation in certain, limited
circumstances.158 The district court acknowledged that the statute
prohibits the introduction of conciliation matters into evidence “to
prove or disprove a claim on the merits,” but stated that the statute
“does not prohibit the introduction of conciliation matters in collateral
proceedings such as contesting the EEOC’s conciliation efforts.”159
Essentially, the district court held that Title VII contains an implied
exception to its confidentiality requirement, which allows for the
information about the conciliation process to be introduced for nonmerit purposes in collateral hearings.160 The EEOC disagreed, stating
in its appellate brief that, “even if the information is used in a nonmerits manner,” allowing such information to make its way into
litigation “would risk a decrease in the open communication necessary
to reach voluntary settlements during the conciliation process.”161 That
is, compromising confidentiality would chill conciliation negotiations
because participants would be concerned that their statements,
154

Id. at 175.
Id.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 174–175.
158
EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, No. 11 CV 879 JPG PMF, 2013 WL 319337,
at *2 (S.D. Ill. Dec. 20, 2013), rev’d, 738 F.3d 171 (7th Cir. 2013).
159
EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, No. 11 CV 879 JPG PMF, 2013 WL
2177770, at *4 (S.D. Ill. Dec 20, 2013).
160
Id.
161
Brief of Appellant, supra note 87, at 9,
155
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including settlement offers, would later be used against them during
litigation.162 The EEOC further argued that, “[i]f Congress envisioned
judicial review, it would make no sense to proscribe parties from
disclosing conciliation information to the court.”163 The Seventh
Circuit agreed with the EEOC, and reasoned that Title VII’s
confidentiality requirement renders judicial review of the conciliation
process impractical because a court would not have access to the
information necessary to make a meaningful determination.164
D. The EEOC’s Broad Discretion in Defining and Administering the
Conciliation Process is Contraindicative to Judicial Review of
Conciliation
The Mach court also stressed that Title VII gives great
deference to the EEOC regarding the conciliation process.165 While the
statute requires the EEOC engage in conciliation efforts prior to filing
a lawsuit, it essentially allows the EEOC to internally define and
administer its conciliation efforts.166 The court stated “Title VII
includes express statutory language making it clear that conciliation is
an informal process entrusted solely to the EEOC’s expert judgment.
167
The court reasoned that such an “open-ended” grant of power to an
administrative agency is not subject to judicial review.168
Title VII uses general language that only requires that the
EEOC “endeavor to eliminate” discriminatory practices through
“informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.”169 As
the court noted, the statute does not further define the conciliation
process, nor does it address “just how many offers, counteroffers,
conferences, or phone calls” would be necessary to satisfy the
162

Id.
Id. at 9.
164
EEOC v. Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 175 (7th Cir. 2013).
165
Id.
166
Id.
167
Id. at 174.
168
Id. at 175.
169
42 U.S.C.A., § 2000e-5(b).
163
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statute.170 Further, Title VII “says nothing about the informal methods
the EEOC is required to use . . . or how hard the agency should
‘endeavor’ to pursue them.”171 The statute also “gives no description
of what a negotiated settlement should look like beyond eliminating
the discriminatory conduct.”172 Furthermore, the court reasoned that
the word “informal” indicates that Congress intended to maintain
flexibility in the conciliation process and that the Commission would
determine the substantive details of the process.173
The court also stressed that Title VII gives the Commission
complete discretion to accept or reject an employer’s offer for any
reason.174 The EEOC can bring suit when it is “unable to secure from
the respondent a conciliation agreement acceptable to the
Commission.”175 Thus, the EEOC is the sole arbiter of whether a
proposed conciliation agreement is “acceptable.”176 Accordingly, even
if the EEOC engaged in extensive conciliation efforts, and the
employer complied throughout the process, the EEOC could still file
suit if, for any reason at all, it was unsatisfied with outcome of the
conciliation process.177 The Mach court characterized the statute as
“an instruction to the EEOC to try, by whatever methods of persuasion
it chooses short of litigation, to secure an agreement that the agency in
its sole discretion finds acceptable.”178 Further, as the EEOC argued in
its appellate brief, the statute’s command that the conciliation process
be “informal,” indicates that the conciliation process is completely
within the EEOC’s domain.179 The Mach court agreed, stating“[i]t
would be difficult for Congress to have packed more deference to
agency decision-making into so few lines of text.”180 The Mach
170

Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 175.
Id.
172
Id.
173
Id. at 174.
174
Id.
175
Id. (emphasis added).
176
Id.
177
Id. at 176.
178
Id.
179
Brief of Appellant, supra note 86, at 10.
180
Mach, 738 F.3d at 174.
171
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court’s reasoning is consistent with other Seventh Circuit cases that
highlight the EEOC’s broad discretion and authority regarding pre-suit
proceedings.181
1.

EEOC v. Elgin Teachers Association

In EEOC v. Elgin Teachers Association, the EEOC sued a
teachers union for damages related to a collective bargaining
agreement that the Commission believed was discriminatory.182 Even
though the school district voluntarily changed the objectionable
portions of the agreement, the EEOC still filed suit, seeking
damages.183 The union claimed the EEOC “lacked the right” to file
suit because the union voluntarily complied with the requirements of
Title VII during the conciliation process.184 The court rejected this
argument, stating that the decision to file suit was within the sole
discretion of the EEOC.185
The court found that the EEOC had authority to file suit merely
because “it failed to get all of what it wanted” during the conciliation
process.186 Namely, the EEOC sought monetary relief, which the
teachers association was unwilling to provide.187 In rendering its
decision, the court noted that the EEOC’s decision to sue the teachers
association was a “peculiar choice.”188 The court found the decision to
be peculiar because, in addition to the fact that the teachers association
had already changed the objectionable provisions of the collective
bargaining agreement, success in litigation for monetary relief would
“ensure that back pay would come from the teachers’ own pockets.”189
Still, the court unambiguously stated that “[w]hether litigating to back
181

See, e.g., EEOC v. Elgin Teachers Assoc., 27 F.3d 292, 293 (7th Cir. 1994);
EEOC v. Caterpillar, Inc. 409 F.3d 831, 832–33 (7th Cir. 2005).
182
Elgin Teachers Assoc.,27 F.3d at 293.
183
Id.
184
Id.at 294.
185
Id.
186
Id. .
187
Id.
188
Id. at 293–94.
189
Id.
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up its demand was prudent is . . . a matter for the conscience of the
person who authorized the suit, rather than for the judiciary.”190
In Mach, the court cited its reasoning in Elgin Teachers
Association, and stated that “the same reasoning applies to judicial
review of conciliation efforts.”191 That is, the conciliation process is
subject to judicial review because the entire process is within the sole
discretion of the EEOC.192 Furthermore, the EEOC has full authority
to file suit after conciliation, even when, as in Elgin Teachers
Association, the employer voluntarily complies with Title VII.193
Accordingly, the Mach court reasoned that it would be futile to probe
into the adequacy of conciliation when the EEOC has full authority to
reject even the most generous conciliation offers.194 Rather, the EEOC
need only plead its compliance with Title VII in its complaint, and
provide the employer with an opportunity make offers of voluntary
compliance.195

2.

EEOC v. Caterpillar, Inc.

Similarly, in EEOC v. Caterpillar, Inc., the Seventh Circuit
held that the EEOC’s pre-suit investigation and reasonable cause
determination regarding a discrimination charge were not judicially
reviewable.196 In Caterpillar, a female employee filed a charge with
the EEOC, claiming that she was fired for spurning her supervisor’s
sexual advances.197 The EEOC sent a notice to the employer, stating
that EEOC had “reasonable cause to believe that Caterpillar, the
employer, discriminated against [the claimant] and a class of female
190

Id. at 294.
EEOC v Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 181 (7th Cir. 2013).
192
Id. at 176 (“The parties here agree that . . . the EEOC is free to refuse an
offer that might appear fair or even generous to a neutral observer.”).
193
Id. at 184 (“all parties acknowledge that the statute grants the EEOC
discretion to reject any particular settlement offer . . . ”).
194
Id. at 175.
195
Id. at 184
196
EEOC v. Caterpillar, Inc. 409 F.3d 831, 833 (7th Cir. 2005).
197
Id. 831.
191
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employees.”198 Caterpillar argued that the latter class-wide allegation
was unrelated to the claimant’s original charge, and moved for
summary judgment on the theory that the EEOC’s lawsuit went
beyond the scope of the investigation required by Title VII.199 The
Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of summary judgment, holding that
the “existence of probable cause to sue is generally and in this instance
not judicially reviewable.”200
The court reasoned that a nexus between the initial charge and
an EEOC’s suit is only a concern when the suit is brought by a private
party, not when the suit is brought by the EEOC itself.201 This is
because, “if a private party were permitted to add claims that had not
been presented in the administrative charge filed with the EEOC, the
Commission’s informal procedures for resolving those charges
. . . would be bypassed, in derogation of the statutory scheme.”202 That
is, if the EEOC was unaware of certain allegations of discriminatory
conduct, it could not investigate or conciliate those allegations before
filing suit as required by Title VII. When the EEOC is the plaintiff,
however, this is not a concern.203 As the court noted, if the EEOC’s
“investigation turns up additional violations, the Commission can add
them to its suit.”204 Therefore, when the suit is brought by the EEOC
itself, “the suit is not confined to claims typified by those of the
charging party.”205
The court’s reasoning in Caterpillar reflected the
Commission’s wide discretion and considerable authority when
deciding whether to file suit against an employer. The Commission is
free to determine the parameters of its investigation and to decide,
based on that investigation, which claims to include in a complaint if it
decides to file suit.206 Citing the reasoning in Caterpillar, the Mach
198

Id. at 832 (emphasis added).
Id.
200
Id. at 833.
201
Id. at 832–33.
202
Id.
203
Id. at 833.
204
Id. at 832.
205
Id. at 833.
206
Id. at 832.
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court stated “[n]othing in the language of Title VII or our past case
law invites courts to review the agency’s finding of probable or
reasonable cause, and the same is true of its approach to
conciliation.”207 Conciliation, like the EEOC’s other pre-suit
procedures, is within the discretion of the EEOC, and is thus not
subject to judicial review.208 Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit
characterized the conciliation process as an opportunity for the
employer to make offers of voluntarily compliance with EEOC
standards, with the EEOC retaining complete discretion over whether
such offers are sufficient to preclude litigation.209 This type of process,
in which one party has absolute final authority, does not lend itself to
judicial review.210
IV.

CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of Title VII’s conciliation requirement is not to
create a hurdle that the EEOC must overcome before it can file an
employment discrimination lawsuit.211 Rather, the requirement is best
characterized as a procedural formality that gives the employer an
opportunity to avoid litigation by voluntarily complying with Title
VII’s requirements.212 Furthermore, allowing judicial review of the
conciliation process would invite employers to “use the conciliation
process to undermine enforcement of Title VII rather than to take the
conciliation process seriously as an opportunity to resolve a
dispute.”213 The court warned that “the potential gains of escaping
liability altogether will, in some cases, more than make up for the risks
of not engaging in serious attempts at conciliation.”214 Employers
would thus be tempted to “turn what was meant to be an informal
207

EEOC v Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 181 (7th Cir. 2013).
Id.
209
See id. at 176–79.
210
Id. at 175 (“Such an open-ended provision looks nothing like a judicially
reviewable prerequisite to suit.”).
211
See id. at 180.
212
See id. at 176–79.
213
Id. at 178.
214
Id. at 179.
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negotiation into the subject of endless disputes over whether the
EEOC did enough before going to court.”215
As the EEOC’s Appellate Attorney Eric Harrington stated, the
Mach decision “permit[s] the district court to address the actual merits
of this case, and enable the Commission to focus its efforts and
resources on enforcing the laws against discrimination."216 Gregory
Gochanour, the EEOC’s supervisory trial attorney for the Chicago
District Office, echoed this sentiment, stating that the Mach decision
“will compel all parties to focus on the issue of whether or not there
actually was employment discrimination."217 Additionally, even
without judicial review, the EEOC’s conciliation efforts are still
subject to meaningful scrutiny because “Congress can exert its
influence on the EEOC through oversight hearings, adjustments
appropriations, and statutory amendments.”218
Moreover, Title VII already provides an “all-purpose remedy”
by which the EEOC’s alleged shortcomings may be addressed.219
Namely, Title VII provides that, if an employee-complainant is
dissatisfied with the EEOC’s progress regarding the employee’s
charge of discrimination, the employee can “circumvent the EEOC
procedures and seek relief through a private enforcement action in a
district court.”220 This remedy does not include judicial review of the
EEOC’s pre-suit procedural actions.221 Indeed, the Seventh Circuit has
explicitly refused to read any additional remedies into the statute,
stating “we do not think Congress could have been more clear in
expressing its intent that the private right of action . . . is an adequate
remedy in a court for the alleged shortcomings in the EEOC’s

215

Id. at 178–79.
EEOC, EEOC In Landmark Ruling, Seventh Circuit Holds Employers
Cannot Challenge EEOC Conciliation, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/12-20-13b.cfm (Dec. 20, 2013).
217
Id.
218
Id. at 180.
219
Stewart v. EEOC, 611 F.2d 679, 683 (7th Cir. 1979).
220
Id. at 682
221
Id. at 683.
216
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handling of the plaintiffs’ charges.”222 Therefore, Title VII already
provides a means by which the EEOC’s alleged shortcomings may be
remedied—namely, the private right of action conditioned upon a 180day waiting period.223 This is the sole remedy for addressing the
EEOC’s shortcomings, and it does not include judicial review of
conciliation.224
Notably, while Title VII provides a remedy for employeecomplainants who are dissatisfied with the EEOC’s execution of its
administrative procedures, it provides no such a remedy for employers
who are dissatisfied with the same procedures.225 This omission
indicates that Congress never intended an employer to have such a
remedy.226 As the Supreme Court stated in Occidental Life, “the
individual’s rights to redress are paramount under the provisions of
Title VII [so] it is necessary that all avenues be left open for quick and
effective relief.”227 The purpose of Title VII is to protect employees,
not employers, especially when the EEOC has already investigated the
employer and has found reasonable cause to believe that the employer
is engaging in discriminatory employment practices.228 As the Mach
court noted, “[t]here is no indication that Title VII’s directive to
conciliate was for the special benefit of the employers or that they
have a right to conciliation.”229 Rather, “Congress was focused on
effective enforcement of the anti-discrimination standards of Title VII,
not creating new rights for employers.”230 Simply put, judicial review

222

Id. (quoting Hall v. EEOC, 456 F.Supp. 695, 701 (N.D.Cal.1978)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
223
Id.
224
Id.
225
Id. at 682 (“[h]ad Congress intended a remedy of enforcement against the
EEOC, the provisions of [Title VII] would have so indicated.”).
226
EEOC v Mach Mining, LLC, 738 F.3d 171, 180 (7th Cir. 2013).
227
Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 366 (U.S. 1977) (quoting
118 Cong. Rec. 1068-1069 (1972).
228
Mach Mining, 738 F.3d at 180.
229
Id.
230
Id.
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of the conciliation process “does not fit well with the broader statutory
scheme of Title VII.”231
Moreover, the Mach court also noted that dismissal of a case
on its merits would be “too final and drastic a remedy for any
procedural deficiency in conciliation.”232 This reasoning is consistent
with the Supreme Court’s acknowledgement that the individual’s right
to redress is “paramount” under Title VII.233 Title VII’s conciliation
requirement was not meant to insulate employers from litigation.
Rather, Title VII’s conciliation requirement provides another “avenue”
by which an employee may obtain “quick and effective relief.”234As
the EEOC’s General Counsel, David Lopez, stated in regards to the
Mach decision, the Seventh Circuit "carefully applied the letter of the
law . . . in a way that promotes Title VII’s goals, protects victims of
discrimination, and preserves the EEOC’s critical law-enforcement
prerogatives.”235

231

Id. at 178.
Id. at 184.
233
Id. at 180.
234
Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 366 (U.S. 1977) (quoting
118 Cong. Rec. 1068-1069 (1972).
235
EEOC, EEOC In Landmark Ruling, Seventh Circuit Holds Employers
Cannot Challenge EEOC Conciliation, available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/release/12-20-13b.cfm (Dec. 20, 2013).
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